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FOREWORD
Egypt, a pivotal country in the Middle East, is facing a significant terrorism problem emanating from
the strategically important Sinai Peninsula, which
borders the vital Suez Canal waterway to its west
and Israel and the unstable Gaza Strip to its east.
Terrorist groups in the Sinai have not only attacked
Egyptian security forces and foreign tourists in that
region (along with periodic attacks against Israeli border posts) but have taken their fight to the Egyptian
mainland, which has caused anxiety among the public. The Egyptian government has used heavy-handed
tactics against these terrorist groups and their sympathizers in the Sinai, but with mixed results. Although
the level of violence has dipped since the summer of
2013, the terrorist groups continue to be active. Moreover, such groups are still able to recruit disaffected
Bedouin youth in the Sinai who often see no viable
alternatives to joining the extremists. Helping Egypt
effectively counter and defeat these terrorist groups,
some of which are copying the brutal tactics of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, is an important U.S.
strategic goal.
Mr. Gregory Aftandilian, a Middle East specialist
and an expert on Egypt, examines the important question of Egyptian public attitudes toward the government’s security crackdowns in the Sinai. He brings to
bear such public attitudes toward the Bedouin inhabitants of the Sinai and how domestic political events
in Egypt, as well as broader instability in region, have
affected public attitudes toward the security policies.
He also shows how instability in the Gaza Strip and
conflicts between Israel and Hamas can impact Egyptian public attitudes toward the security crackdowns
in the Sinai.
v

Mr. Aftandilian also provides cogent recommendations for U.S. civilian policymakers and U.S. Army
officers in dealing with their Egyptian counterparts on
this terrorism problem. He offers a comprehensive approach involving both military and economic policies.
The Strategic Studies Institute hopes the findings
and recommendations in this monograph will be of
assistance to U.S. civilian strategic planners and U.S.
Army officers as they try to help Egypt to deal with its
terrorism problem.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Mr. Gregory Aftandilian examines Egypt’s public support for the Egyptian government’s security
crackdowns in the Sinai where terrorist groups have
undertaken violent attacks against security forces and
foreign tourists and have even taken their fight to the
Egyptian mainland. Although the leadership of these
terrorist groups appear to be from mainland Egypt
(those living along the Nile River and in the Nile Delta
region), much of the rank and file appear to be disaffected Bedouin youth in the Sinai who have become
susceptible to the entreaties of the terrorists.
Because most mainland Egyptians harbor negative
views toward the Bedouin and because much of the
Sinai is a closed military zone and a wilderness area,
most Egyptian citizens are not bothered by the government’s heavy-handed security measures in the Sinai.
Indeed, the vast majority of Egyptians desire stability and appear to give the Egyptian government wide
berth to crack down hard against the terrorist groups.
A complicating factor is the violence in the neighboring Gaza Strip. In the summer of 2014, the Egyptian
government blamed Hamas for foolishly instigating
the fight with Israel and relied on negative Egyptian
public perceptions of a Hamas-Muslim Brotherhood
nexus to justify its policy of keeping the Sinai-Gaza
border closed. However, when Palestinian civilian casualties in that conflict started to mount, some Egyptian citizens began to question the Egyptian government’s cooperation with Israel, and this development
was one of the reasons why Cairo attempted to broker
a cease-fire between the two sides. If the more moderate Palestinian faction, Fatah, takes over Gaza and
another mini-war breaks out between Israel and Gaza,
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the Egyptian government will have a much more
difficult time trying to manage public opinion.
Mr. Aftandilian argues for enhanced counterterrorism assistance to help Egyptian authorities fight
the Sinai-based terrorist groups. He recommends the
reconvening of a U.S.-Egyptian strategic dialogue
where U.S. Army officers can brief their Egyptian
counterparts on successful counterterrorism policies.
In addition, he recommends bringing Egyptian military officers to the United States to attend counterterrorism classes at U.S. professional military educational
institutes, as well as training whole Egyptian military
units by U.S. Army counterterrorism specialists in either the United States or in a friendly Arab country. He
also recommends programs to help disaffected Bedouin youth in the Sinai (such as persuading Egyptian
authorities to recruit some of them into local police
forces and an extensive job training program, funded
in part by the United States), to give such youth meaningful alternatives to joining terrorist groups.
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ASSESSING EGYPTIAN PUBLIC SUPPORT
FOR SECURITY CRACKDOWNS IN THE SINAI
Egypt has a serious security threat emanating from
the Sinai Peninsula. Over the past several years, but
especially since the ouster of Muslim Brotherhood
President Mohammad Morsi in early-July 2013, the
level of terrorist activity and violence against Egyptian security forces has escalated to high-levels. The
violence threatens Egypt’s stability and its ability to
get its troubled economy to rebound, particularly over
such important economic engines as tourism and foreign investment. Newly elected Egyptian President
(and former Field Marshal) Abdel Fatah al-Sissi stated
in his inaugural speech that, as president, stamping out terrorism is his first priority.1 For the United
States, the security problem in the Sinai has important
ramifications as well. It threatens the stability of the
most populous country in the Middle East region—a
linchpin state in the area; it threatens the peace treaty
between Egypt and Israel; it has the potential of a spillover effect to threaten the vital Suez Canal waterway,
upon which U.S. military ships (as well as merchant
ships) pass from the Mediterranean to eastern Africa,
the Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf.2
The Egyptian military, which has taken the lead
in security operations in the Sinai, seems determined
to use maximum force to pacify the Sinai and eliminate the threat posed by the terrorist groups. One of
the key questions that has not been explored is: How
much leeway, in terms of Egyptian public opinion,
does the Egyptian military have in these security
operations? In other words, to what extent does the
Egyptian public give the Egyptian military wide berth
to carry out such operations? Related to this question
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is to what extent such operations can backfire and rebound against the Egyptian military and government
if they are not successful? Furthermore, to what extent
can such operations, because they employ so much
violence and severely impact the lives of Bedouin villagers, create even more problems for the military and
impact the attitudes of Egyptians concerned about the
government’s human rights abuses?
Characteristics of the Sinai and Its
Complicated Image.
The Sinai Peninsula is a very complicated piece of
territory. The western part straddles the important
Suez Canal waterway, with the major cities of Port
Said, Ismailiya, and Suez located on the western side
of the canal. The southern tip of the Sinai includes the
important resort areas of Sharm El-Shiekh and Ras
Muhammad, which draw many thousands of European tourists every year and are an important source
of revenue for the state. The town of Taba by the Israeli border and the Gulf of Aqaba in the southeastern
portion of the Sinai traditionally has attracted Israeli
and other foreign tourists. The central, northern, and
eastern parts of the Sinai are mainly mountainous
and desert areas inhabited by Bedouins who traditionally have been marginalized in Egyptian society.
They have a reputation in mainland Egypt as a sort
of lawless and rootless people who earn their living
by smuggling and other nefarious activities.3 Whether
this characterization is justified or not, it seems to be
widely held by the Egyptian people who inhabit the
Nile region, that is, most of the population. Hence, in
the eyes of most Egyptians, the Bedouins are not considered truly “Egyptian.” They live on Egyptian terri-
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tory but are not considered full citizens. For example,
they are excluded and exempted from the military
and the police services for complicated reasons, but
in large part because their loyalty to the nation-state
has always been suspect. Correspondingly, they have
always received a much smaller share of state resources.4 In addition, in the northeastern part of the Sinai,
bordering the Gaza Strip, there is a small community
of Palestinians who have been living there as refugees
since the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.
As a kind of “wilderness area,” most of the Sinai
is largely unknown to the Egyptian public. It has never been a place where Egyptians from the Nile have
settled, except for the development of the resort areas in and near Sharm El-Sheikh since the mid-1980s.
Much of the peninsula has long been a closed military area, contributing to its rather mysterious and
wilderness status.
This is not to say that the Egyptian people do not
consider the Sinai as Egyptian territory. Indeed, when
Israeli forces occupied the Sinai after the 1967 war, the
peninsula’s loss was seen as humiliating by the Egyptian people, a situation that needed to be rectified.5
The Sinai is important strategically for Egypt because
it is a “buffer zone” between Israel and “mainland”
Egypt, and it gives mainland Egypt a kind of “strategic depth” in the face of invasions coming from the
east (as proved to be the case when the Ottoman army
invaded it in the early stages of World War I, and
when the Israelis invaded it in 1956 and 1967). Former
Egyptian president Anwar Sadat invested much time
and energy trying to retrieve the Sinai through a combination of war and diplomacy. In the October 1973
war, the Egyptian military’s successful crossing of the
Suez Canal and the recovery of territory in the west-
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ern part of the Sinai was seen as a great victory by the
Egyptian people because they had finally gotten some
of their lost lands back and had inflicted substantial
military losses on the Israelis. Although the Israelis
counterattacked, and the war was fought to a sort of
draw, Egyptians still tout that war as a great victory
after the humiliating defeat and the loss of the Sinai
in 1967. Subsequent diplomatic efforts supported by
the United States in the form of the Camp David Accords of 1978, and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of
1979, enabled Egypt to retrieve all of the Sinai by 1982.
Although Egypt was criticized by much of the Arab
world for concluding a so-called “separate peace”
with Israel, Sadat and most Egyptian citizens held the
view that Egypt had made enormous sacrifices for the
Palestinian and Arab cause since 1948, and no country
had the right to criticize it for getting its lands back.6
One of the consequences of the Israeli occupation
of the Sinai from 1967 to the early-1980s was that there
were suspicions that many of the Bedouins in the Sinai had collaborated with the Israelis.7 The Bedouin
deny this charge, but the notion persists among many
mainland Egyptians, and it may be one of the reasons
why the Egyptian military continues to exclude the
Bedouin from military service.
Another consequence of the Israeli occupation of
the Sinai was that, as a price for peace and the return
of the Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty (including oil
resources there at the time), Cairo was compelled to
accept military restrictions (concerning the amount of
military equipment and troops) within various zones
in the Sinai Peninsula. The Multinational Force and
Observers (MFO) peacekeeping force, supported by
the United States, has been monitoring this agreement
since that time. Egyptian officials, and Egyptians with
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general knowledge of these restrictions, were never
happy with this arrangement, but they grudgingly accepted it as the price to retrieve the Sinai. Periodically,
there have been calls by some nationalist and Islamist
political figures in Egypt to revise the terms of these
military restrictions,8 but nothing official has come of
this because it would take the concurrence of the Israeli government to do so. Nonetheless, with the upsurge of violence by extremists in the Sinai since 2011,
the Israelis and the Egyptian governments have come
to behind-the-scenes agreements and understandings
to allow more Egyptian military assets to be deployed
to their common border than would otherwise be the
case. It appears that the Israelis are generally accepting of the deployment of additional Egyptian military
assets to the border, as they serve both countries’ interests in seeing the Sinai pacified and tunnel activity
from the Sinai into Gaza closed. One Israeli scholar,
writing in January 2014, noted:
Over the past year, Israel and Egypt have used little-known, legally permissible understanding—the
Agreed Activities Mechanism—to bypass restrictions
on the number and type of Egyptian forces permitted
in much of the Sinai. In doing so, they have made defacto modifications to their 1979 peace treaty without
resorting to the diplomatically risky procedure of
‘reviewing’ the treaty itself. As a result, considerable
Egyptian army forces are now constantly deployed in
central and eastern Sinai (Areas B and C of the peninsula, respectively), in a manner and scope never envisioned by the teams that negotiated the treaty more
than 3 decades ago.9

The only time the Israelis protested this increase
in military assets was in August 2012 when the Egyptian military apparently did not inform the Israelis in
5

advance about the movement of military assets close
to the border.10 But this disagreement soon dissipated,
and cooperation between the Egyptian and Israeli
military and intelligence services reportedly has been
working smoothly since that time, even during the
presidency of Mohammad Morsi.11
Developments in the Sinai.
Prior to the 2011 revolution which led to the resignation of Hosni Mubarak as president, Egypt’s main
fight with terrorists occurred in the 1990s in the Egyptian mainland, when the Islamic Group Al-Gamaa AlIslamiyya and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad undertook
attacks against regime officials, policemen, and foreign tourists, hoping to weaken the state and somehow cause the regime to fall.12 Although hundreds
of Egyptians and scores of foreign tourists died over
the course of the 1990s, the regime was able to defeat
these terrorists through a combination of security
measures, economic development in some neglected
urban areas, as well as in rural areas of Upper Egypt,
and effective propaganda. Perhaps more importantly,
most Egyptians, while disliking the Mubarak regime,
never saw these terrorist groups as viable alternatives
to Mubarak’s rule. Furthermore, the terrorists’ tactics
of attacking foreign tourists and policemen were seen
as both “un-Egyptian” and “un-Islamic,” for they only
contributed to hurting Egypt’s image abroad and putting hundreds of thousands of people involved in the
tourist industry out of work.
After the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks by alQaeda against the United States, there appears to have
been some extremists (whether Egyptian or foreign),
perhaps affiliated with al-Qaeda, who came to the
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Sinai to undertake terrorist acts against foreign tourists and Israeli targets. Although only a few of such
attacks occurred between 2004 and 2006, the Egyptian military reacted strongly against them, especially
since they occurred in the Sinai resort towns of Sharm
El-Sheikh, Taba, and Dahab, which are important
sources of foreign revenue. The Egyptian government
claimed that the October 7, 2004, attack in Taba, which
killed 34 and wounded 171, was undertaken by a Palestinian who had recruited some mainland Egyptians
and Bedouins as accomplices. In the aftermath of this
incident, the Egyptian government rounded up 2,400
people, the majority of whom were probably Bedouin,
and kept many of them incarcerated for years.13 Three
purportedly mainland Egyptians were later sentenced
to death.
Despite government claims that it either rounded
up or killed the perpetrators of these attacks, the dragnet did not apparently capture all of the terrorists.
More worrisome, these terrorists were able to continue
to entice many disaffected Bedouin youths to join their
ranks and inculcate them in Islamist extremist beliefs.
At the same time, after Hamas took control of the Gaza
Strip from Fatah in 2007 and Israel imposed a trade
embargo on the area, tunnel digging—and the smuggling of goods, food, and weapons—became a very lucrative activity between the Sinai and the Gaza Strip.
This smuggling activity was especially important for
Hamas during and after the first of several mini-wars
between the Hamas and Israel in 2008. Who actually
dug the tunnels remains somewhat unclear (Palestinians or Bedouin), but certainly the terrorist groups,
including Hamas, and some Bedouin tribesmen, benefitted substantially from the smuggling activity. As
the smuggling business thrived, many Bedouin tribes
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became essentially armed gangs with military equipment, such as machine gun-mounted pickup trucks.
Egyptian police forces soon proved to be no match for
such armed groups.14
Developments since the 2011 Revolution.
During the Egyptian revolution of January-February 2011, thousands of inmates in Egyptian prisons
were freed or freed themselves in the chaos that ensued when the police abandoned their posts. Included
in this group were many terrorists, some of whom
remained in mainland Egypt while others went to
the Sinai. One of the prominent escapees was Ramzi
Mawafi, a doctor who joined al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in the 1990s, but was subsequently arrested by
Egyptian authorities. According to Egyptian security
officials who spoke to the Associated Press, Mawafi is
believed to be in the Sinai coordinating the terrorist
groups and helping them secure money and weapons.15 In the Sinai itself, the temporary “disappearance
of the security state gave Sinai’s population the opportunity to avenge its suffering by sacking abandoned
checkpoints, police stations, and intelligence offices
throughout the peninsula.”16 The Supreme Council of
the Armed Forces (SCAF), which initially ruled Egypt
after the revolution, tried to quell such activity in the
Sinai, but with mixed results. SCAF put more troops
into the Sinai to fill the security vacuum left by the ineffective police forces, but these troops were unable to
pacify the area or prevent the gas pipeline from Egypt
to Israel from being attacked several times. During
2011, the Bedouin tribesmen, probably in conjunction
with extremist elements:
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attacked the police station in al-Arish, orchestrated
seven pipeline explosions, repeatedly disrupted traffic on the main road to the trade terminal with Israel,
skirmished with Egyptian forces that have ventured
into Wadi Amr and other Bedouin strongholds, and
expanded their large-scale trade in organs harvested
from African immigrants.17

Shortly after Mohammad Morsi of the Muslim
Brotherhood won the presidency in the summer of
2012, a serious terrorist incident occurred in the Sinai.
On August 5, 2012, a group of Islamist extremists fired
on Egyptian soldiers in the Sinai border town of Rafah, killing 16 of them, stole their armored vehicles,
and attempted to smash into the Israeli side of the
border before being stopped by Israeli forces.18 The
incident was an embarrassment for the Egyptian military, and Morsi used it to reshuffle Egypt’s military
and intelligence services. Minister of Defense Hussein
Tantawi and Army Chief of Staff Sami Annan (both
of whom had opposed Morsi for political reasons)
were sacked, as were the heads of air force and navy
commands. Abdel Fatah al-Sissi, then head of military intelligence, was named Defense Minister. This
reshuffling of the military hierarchy proved popular
with the Egyptian people, some of which favored the
removal of the SCAF old guard leadership because of
the SCAF’s repressive policies in the 2011-12 period,19
while others believed that Egyptian soldiers should
have been better protected against the extremists, and
that the top brass should be held accountable.
Interestingly, shortly after this leadership shakeup,
new Defense Minister al-Sissi traveled to the North
Sinai on August 20, 2012, to meet with disaffected
Bedouin tribal leaders to hear their complaints and
to enlist their support against the extremists. Report9

edly, al-Sissi offered rewards to the Bedouins to collect weapons in the area, and he promised that $165
million in development assistance would be sent to
the region.20 It is not known whether any weapons
were collected or such assistance was ever rendered.
Morsi himself promised economic development in the
North Sinai, but this never materialized, according to
one analyst, in part because of fiscal constraints and
pressing needs in the Egyptian mainland.21
In early-July 2013, Morsi was ousted by al-Sissi
and imprisoned after millions of Egyptians came
out to protest his rule. Egypt’s public prosecutor in
May 2014 said that investigations of terrorist suspects
showed that Morsi had struck a deal with the main
terrorist group in the Sinai, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (Supporters of Jerusalem), to refrain from attacks during
his presidency in exchange for pardoning members
of the group.22 It is difficult to verify these charges.
Morsi’s public encouragement of Egyptians going to
Syria to fight against the Assad regime, and the statement of one of his top aides that Egyptians who did
so would not be prosecuted upon their return,23 was
probably a cause of concern for the Egyptian military
and intelligence services who were worried about the
returnees from such conflicts.
What is known is that after Morsi was overthrown,
terrorist activity in Sinai increased markedly. Egyptian military and security services came under attack
almost daily in the Sinai in the summer of 2013, replete with roadside bombs and executions of military
personnel. The new, military-backed Egyptian government blamed the Muslim Brotherhood for these
attacks and claimed that the Brotherhood not only
had close ties to these terrorist groups in the Sinai, but
were actively coordinating with them. One Brother-
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hood leader claimed that these attacks were in retaliation for the coup against Morsi.24 Whether this statement was based on the actual situation, or was merely
bravado meant to scare the military, is unknown, but
it played into the Egyptian military’s narrative that
all of the terrorist violence was linked to the Brotherhood. One thoughtful analyst has written that:
more likely, the increase in salafi jihadist attacks came
from an opportunism on the part of the militants—
who were not supporters of the Brotherhood while it
was in power—and a response to a newly activist military in the [Sinai] peninsula: an increase in Egyptian
military forces provided an increase in salafi jihadist
targets.25

For its part, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis tried to capitalize
on the government’s severe crackdown on pro-Morsi
supporters in mid-August 2013 by stating: “We were
horrified by what they saw of massacres against the
helpless Muslim masses.”26
Terrorist Groups in the Sinai.
The extremist elements in the Sinai are made up of
several groups, perhaps with membership numbering
about 1,600,27 the most prominent being Ansar Beit alMaqdis who probably came into being in 2011. Membership in this organization is somewhat murky, but
it is believed to consist mostly of Egyptian nationals,
some of whom, including a few former Egyptian army
officers, had fought with Islamist extremist forces in
the Syrian civil war, plus a smattering of foreign Arabs who have come to the Sinai after having fought
in Syria and other conflict areas. The group claimed
responsibility for the August 2011 rocket attacks on
11

Eilat, Israel, near Egypt’s Sinai border with Israel, during which 13 Israelis were killed. In October 2011, alQaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri praised this operation
and added that one of its gains was:
exposing the treason of the ruling [Egyptian] military
council, which was quick to send it troops to chase
[Ansar operatives] in order to protect Israel’s security,
and then begging from Israel to increase the forces in
the area so as to pursue Israel’s enemies.28

One press report noted that Ansar Beit al-Maqdis has
shown:
it can build and remotely detonate large bombs in
strategic locations, gather intelligence about the precise timing of movements by their targets, record their
own attacks and manage the complicated maintenance
of an advanced portable surface-to-air missile—all
suggesting combat experience.29

Interestingly, both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which was disowned by
al-Qaeda, have endorsed Ansar Beit al-Maqdis. In an alQaeda video, Zawahiri referred to the group as “our
people in Sinai” and showed a funeral for some of its
fallen fighters. Zawahiri added that “we must be determined to thwart the Americanized coup in Egypt.”30
Meanwhile, ISIL featured a video of an Egyptian national who fought with them in Syria, urging his fellow
Egyptians to take up arms against the Cairo regime.
ISIL also featured an Islamic court judge in Syria vowing to support “the mujahedeen in Sinai and the Muslims in Egypt” with “our hearts, our men, and what
we can supply you with.”31 In early November 2014,
Ansar Beit al-Maqdis swore allegiance to ISIL.31a Complicating the picture is that some Egyptian security
12

officials have claimed that Ansar is the Egyptian wing
of a Gaza-based salafi jihadist group, though this has
not been proven.32
In early-2014, one Ansar Beit al-Maqdis operative
even shot down a military helicopter over the Sinai
with a man-portable air defense (MANPAD) system
that was probably an SA-16 missile, marking the first
time such a missile was used in Egypt by the terrorists, suggesting some obtained training in either Syria
or Iraq.33 Ansar Beit al-Maqdis also has taken responsibility for the attacks against security officials and
forces in mainland Egypt from September 2013 to
the present.
On August 18, 2014, a group calling itself “The Islamic State in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt” claimed responsibility for two attacks earlier in the month in which
five policemen were killed. The same group also
claimed responsibility for an attack against an Egyptian army post in Farafra in Egypt’s Western Desert in
July 2014, during which 23 soldiers and officers were
killed.34 However, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis also took credit
for these same attacks, suggesting Ansar may be capitalizing on the Islamic State’s name to sow confusion
and to link itself to the militancy of the group that has
taken over large swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq.
Other extremist groups in the Sinai include Tawhid
wal Jihad, an al-Qaeda inspired group believed to have
been involved in the 2004-06 terrorist incidents in the
Sinai mentioned earlier. Although severely weakened
by the large-scale arrests that followed, Tawhid wal
Jihad is believed by the Egyptian security services to
have retained its military wing, though its military
commander reportedly was killed by the security
forces in January 2014. Other reports suggest that remaining Tawhid wal Jihad militants have joined Ansar
Beit al-Maqdis.35
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Another group is the Muhammad Jamal Network,
named after its leader, Muhammad Jamal, who was
first trained by al-Qaeda in the late-1980s. He reportedly has maintained links to Zawahiri as well as alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Qaeda in the
Maghreb. He was imprisoned by the Mubarak regime,
released in early-2012 following the revolution, and
re-arrested in November 2012 following suspicions
that his group was involved in the Benghazi attack
on U.S. officials 2 months earlier. It is unknown how
large his following is in the Sinai, but there are press
reports suggesting that it collaborates with Ansar Beit
al-Maqdis.36
There are some other reports suggesting a presence of the Yemeni-based group, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, in the Sinai. In August 2012, CNN, citing an Egyptian security official, claimed that Yemeni
militants had come to the Sinai to train local jihadis.
In early-September 2013, based on Bedouin sources,
Associated Press reported that there had been a recent influx of foreign fighters into the Sinai, including
several hundred Yemenis.37 It is not possible to verify
these figures. Egyptian sources believe that while
there are probably some foreign Arab fighters in the
Sinai, like the Yemenis, the figure of several hundred
is probably an exaggeration; the bulk of the fighters
are either from mainland Egypt or Bedouin recruits
from the Sinai.38
In addition to these mainly Egyptian groups, there
are unconfirmed reports of Palestinian salafi groups
undergoing training in the Gaza Strip and then, after
such training, traveling through the underground
tunnels to the Sinai where they aid the terrorist cells of
such groups as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis. This assessment is
the view of Egyptian intelligence, according to some
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press reports,39 and probably accounts in part for the
hostility of the Egyptian security services toward
Hamas outside of the Muslim Brotherhood-Hamas
connection. It is doubtful that these salafi groups
would be able to train in the Gaza Strip without the
knowledge of Hamas. One press report noted that
Hamas is thought to have an agreement with Mumtaz
Dughmush, the head of the Palestinian salafi militant
group, Jaish al-Islam, which purportedly runs training
camps in Gaza for jihadists who subsequently go to
fight in Yemen, Syria, and the Sinai.40 The purported
links between the Palestinian salafi groups and the
Sinai-based terrorist groups also account for the Egyptian military’s clampdown on the tunnels and efforts
to seal the border as much as possible.
Transporting Terrorism to the Egyptian Mainland.
More worrisome to the Egyptian government and
people has been the violent actions of the Sinai-based
terrorist groups to undertake attacks in Cairo and
other areas of the Egyptian mainland. In September
2013, Ansar carried out a failed assassination attempt
against Egyptian Interior Minister Mohammed Ibrahim.41 In December 2013, Ansar detonated a large
car bomb against the security directorate building in
Mansoura, killing 15 people. The following month, it
carried out more bombings in Cairo, including one
that targeted the Cairo Security Directorate.42 In lateJanuary 2014, it assassinated a police general and an
interior ministry official. Late-January 2014 also witnessed the death of five policemen in the Beni Suef
governorate in a firefight with militants.43
Although attacks in the Egyptian mainland
dropped in February and March, they picked up again
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in April 2014. Early that month, three bomb blasts
took place near Cairo University, killing a senior police officer and wounding at least five other people.
The officer was head of the investigations unit of the
West Giza district in greater Cairo, suggesting that
he was specially targeted. A group called Ajnad Misr
(Soldiers of Egypt) took responsibility. It was unclear
if this was a new group or merely a cell of Ansar Beit
al-Maqdis, trying to confuse the authorities by using
another name. From July 2013 to late-April 2014, according to the Egyptian government, about 500 army
personnel, police officers, and officials were killed by
the terrorist groups.44
Since the summer of 2014, the terrorist groups have
also started to attack civilian targets. On June 25, 2014,
there were four rudimentary car bomb attacks in the
Cairo metro during rush hour. No deaths occurred,
but six people were injured. Three days later, an improvised explosive device (IED) was detonated in a
building in Giza, south of Cairo, killing a girl and her
mother. On July 3, 2014, the anniversary of the removal of Morsi from power, a bomb exploded on a local
train in the city of Alexandria, injuring nine people.45
It is unclear which group(s) were behind these
attacks on ordinary citizens. They were probably designed to sow panic in the general public and to try
to turn the public against the military-backed government. The authorities, not surprisingly, blamed the
Muslim Brotherhood for the attacks, as it had with
previous attacks. Whether the Brotherhood is actually
behind such attacks is not known. Some analysts have
speculated that since the summer 2013 crackdown on
the organization, some younger elements of the Brotherhood, without the guidance from senior officials in
the organization, nearly all of whom are now incar-
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cerated, may have joined the actual terrorist groups
out of frustration. Some other Brotherhood members,
particularly in the summer of 2013, engaged in more
rudimentary attacks against police forces and Coptic
Churches, usually by hurling Molotov cocktails at
such targets.46 Such attacks differed from the more
sophisticated attacks against police targets by Ansar
Beit Al-Maqdis in December 2013 and January 2014. On
July 4, 2014, however, there was a blast at a farm in
Fayoum, southwest of Cairo, killing four people who
were trying to assemble an IED. The farm was reportedly owned by a Brotherhood activist, suggesting that
at least in this case, some Brotherhood members were
attempting to engage in violence.47 In mid-August
2014, the Egyptian authorities accused the Muslim
Brotherhood of trying to blow up power line pylons
in an effort to exacerbate electricity shortages in Egypt
that are affecting millions of families.48 Again, it is not
known whether the Brotherhood was actually behind
these attacks or whether this was merely another case
of the government’s propaganda campaign against
the organization.
In the meantime, Ansar has continued to undertake terrorist attacks in the Sinai. For example, in February 2014, it attacked a tour bus of South Koreans in
Taba, and it has continued to strike against military
targets in the Sinai. On August 20, 2014, four beheaded
corpses were found in the town of Sheikh Zuwaid in
the Sinai. The victims were believed to have been Sinai residents who were targeted by the extremists for
cooperating with the Egyptian police and army.49 A
day earlier, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis posted a video online
showing the murder of Egyptian soldiers and scenes
of an attack on an army checkpoint. The video contained a clip of one of Ansar’s leaders admonishing the

17

soldiers for taking up arms for “your leader” (meaning President al-Sissi), who “took the side of the U.S.
without hesitation . . .” The soldiers were also admonished for killing “jihadists” and not getting blamed
for doing so.50 Needless to say, such images and video
clips have undoubtedly angered the Egyptian military
and the public, especially since the military is a largely
conscript army.
Egyptian Government’s Response in the Sinai.
The Egyptian government has often used brutal
methods in the Sinai that have matched at times the
brutality of the terrorists. In the summer of 2013, in
an example of the latter, terrorists in the Sinai pulled
police recruits from buses, laid them on the ground,
and shot 25 of them to death.51 In response to such
incidents, the military has often used helicopter gunships to strike suspected militant hideouts in several
villages in northern Sinai, killing many people, not
necessarily all extremists, in the process. One North
Sinai villager told the independent press that military
helicopters in the summer of 2013 shelled his village
“almost daily” in 1 week. He continued, “Imagine, in
1 week, they bombarded the village with more than
a hundred shells.”52 In addition to strikes from the
air, the military has also used tanks against Bedouin
villages. A villager reported that in September 2013:
a tank positioned itself in an elevated sandy area and
shelled the houses randomly. Most of the residents
fled their homes as soon as they heard the sound of
tanks, but in one of the homes that had been shelled,
we found the bodies of a mother and four children
who were killed by the shelling.53
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In addition, the military reportedly has cut down
hundreds of olive trees on the road from El Arish to
Rafah in the northern Sinai, presumably to prevent
terrorists from using the trees as cover for their own
operations against the military but also, in part, as punitive measures against villages suspected of harboring terrorists.54
Some villagers in the North Sinai have admitted
to journalists “the presence of armed men” in some
villages, but said that the military, by using collective
punishment on mostly peaceful villagers, is fighting
“terrorism with terrorism” and is “creating terrorism” by compelling the disaffected youth to join the
extremists.55 The government has promised that it
would compensate villagers to mitigate the effects of
such heavy-handed security measures against innocent villagers and their building and crops, but such
villagers have reportedly seen no recompense yet.
In 2014, the Egyptian Observatory for Rights and
Freedoms issued a scathing report on the Egyptian
army’s operations in the North Sinai, and characterized the transgressions as “crimes against humanity.”
The report noted “systematic violations” committed
by the military, adding that military operations in the
North Sinai alone had left 200 people dead, 1,500 arrested, and destroyed more than 350 houses since July
3, 2013.56 In addition, on January 25, 2014, 13 Egyptian human rights groups wrote an open letter to the
authorities criticizing the excessive force by the military, and calling upon them to employ a more “comprehensive approach” to take into consideration the
“economic, social, and political” circumstances of the
region, adding that “counterterrorism efforts must not
include arbitrary measures but rather be conducted
within a framework that respects the law and indi-
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vidual rights throughout the process of identifying
the real perpetrators.”57
Although the government’s response has elicited
strong criticism from Egypt’s human rights community, the Egyptian public, by and large, does not seem
to be bothered by such heavy-handed military tactics
in the Sinai. First, mainland Egyptians have very few
family connections to the Bedouin residents of the Sinai, and second, because of their low opinion of the
Bedouins and the prejudices they have toward them,
coupled with anger at the terrorist incidents emanating from the Sinai, mainland Egyptians have little
sympathy toward the plight of the Bedouins now under siege.58 In the aftermath of the upsurge in terrorist
violence not just in the Sinai but in mainland Egypt,
in January 2014, one Egyptian citizen told the press
that he would be voting “yes” on the new post-Morsi
constitution “because there is a terrorist organization
that is trying to destroy us.”59 Another Egyptian citizen said that a vote for the constitution was a vote for
al-Sissi, “and Egypt will be safe again.”60 Although
such quotes are not a scientific gage of public opinion,
they seem to be widely held among many ordinary
Egyptians—probably a majority—who harbor negative attitudes toward the Muslim Brotherhood and all
Islamist extremist groups, and keenly want stability to
return to the country.61
The Impact of Renewed Conflict between
Israel and Hamas.
The renewed military confrontation between Israel
and Hamas that broke out in July 2014 put additional
pressure on the Egyptian government and complicated public attitudes toward the Sinai situation.
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The government-supported media in Egypt blamed
Hamas for the conflict, and charged that the missile
strikes by Hamas against Israel and Israel’s military
retaliation led to the loss of hundreds of Palestinian
lives while doing very little damage on Israel. In other
words, the pro-government Egyptian media put out
the line that Hamas was foolhardy and irresponsible
for provoking such a conflict when its outcome was
never in doubt. Several pro-government media commentators even made sarcastic remarks about Hamas
leader Khaled Mashaal, claiming he was living the life
of luxury in Qatar while Palestinians were dying by the
hundreds in Gaza because of his foolish policy. One
Egyptian commentator stated that he would personally drive Mashaal to the Egyptian-Gaza border and
drop him off there so he could perform jihad against
Israel—in other words, the commentator was taking
Mashaal and other Hamas leaders to task for living
in safety while Gaza was in flames and Palestinian
civilians were bearing the brunt of the confrontation.
Other pro-government television commentators also
criticized Hamas for initially rejecting Egypt’s efforts
to broker a truce and charged that Hamas’ demands
were unrealistic. One commentator said that one of
these demands—having an Arab country (not Egypt)
in control of the Rafah crossing point between Gaza
and the Sinai, was an affront to Egyptian sovereignty. He added sarcastically that Hamas, by this logic,
should simply take over Tahrir Square in downtown
Cairo.62
Throughout the conflict, Egypt kept the border with
Gaza closed, only allowing some wounded Palestinians to come across for medical treatment in Egyptian
hospitals. It also allowed for the delivery of some humanitarian supplies to Gaza that was provided by the
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Egyptian military. But the Egyptian government was
strongly against private Egyptians doing the same.
Some opposition party activists signed a petition to
President al-Sissi requesting that the government do
more. One private convoy of 11 buses and 550 activists was stopped at an Egyptian military checkpoint
in the Sinai on the way to Gaza and was told to turn
back, supposedly because the military “had security
concerns for the safety of the convoy.”63 Another convoy carrying medical supplies and made up of 12
people, including a pharmacist who was a member
of the “Popular Campaign to Support the Palestinian
Uprising,” was able to make it all the way to Rafah by
the Gaza border, but not before being stopped by the
military at several checkpoints. The medical supplies
were then supposed to be picked up by the Palestinian
Red Crescent society.64 It was not clear if the Palestinian Red Crescent Society was able to cross the border
to pick up the supplies, or if the Egyptian military
transported the supplies to the Red Crescent society
on the other side of the border.
As the Gaza conflict dragged on for several weeks
in July and the Palestinian civilian death toll mounted, the Egyptian government started to worry about
public opinion. While the pro-government Egyptian
media did its best to limit the coverage of the conflict
and blame Hamas for prolonging it, many Egyptians
turned to other media outlets like Al Jazeera television
that is owned by the government of Qatar. Although
the Egyptian government has tried to de-legitimize Al
Jazeera because of its purported support for the Muslim Brotherhood, its more focused coverage of the
Gaza conflict may have revived its stock in Egypt.65
Not surprisingly, Egyptian supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood tried to stage several demonstrations
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in mainland Egypt in support of Hamas and the Palestinians of Gaza and against what they saw was the
Egyptian government’s collusion with Israel to keep
Gaza locked up. The government responded forcefully against these demonstrations and arrested many of
the participants. Although such measures succeeded
in quieting the Egyptian streets, the government was
undoubtedly concerned about public opinion and, as
a hedge, started to criticize Israel for its military actions in Gaza. This government criticism followed the
criticism of some Egyptian commentators who were
not affiliated with the Brotherhood and who said
that al-Sissi should separate his anger at Hamas from
support for the Palestinian people.66
Egypt’s relationship with the Palestinian issue is
very complicated. For decades, Egypt has championed the Palestinian cause and fought several wars
ostensibly on behalf of the Palestinians. Most Egyptians sympathize with the Palestinians and hold
strong views against Israel despite several decades of
peace. These views tend to intensify during periodic
conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians.67 During
the late Mubarak period, such as in 2008, many Egyptian citizens—not just Muslim Brotherhood supporters—demonstrated against the Egyptian government
for not doing enough to help the Palestinians while
an Israeli-Hamas conflict was taking place.68 During the 2014 conflict between Israel and Hamas, one
thoughtful analyst and an expert on Egyptian public
opinion noted:
though many Egyptians view Hamas as an ally of
the Muslim Brotherhood, most sympathize with the
Palestinians and are angry at Israel. When they see
the scale of casualties—for example, the death and
destruction in the Shuja’iah neighborhood in Gaza—
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they overwhelmingly blame Israel. This is true even
as their leaders express anger over Hamas’s refusal to
accept Egypt’s ceasefire proposal.69

On the other hand, there have been times, like in
1979 when Egypt was ostracized in the Arab world for
signing its peace treaty with Israel, when Egyptians
have felt that they have done more than their share for
the Palestinian and larger Arab cause, and if the Palestinians and other Arabs do not like it, so be it. Further
complicating matters is that Egyptian views toward
the Palestinians are not only shaped by periodic Palestinian-Israeli conflicts but by intra-Palestinian politics and the struggles between Hamas and Fatah (the
latter in charge of the Palestinian Authority), which
tend to be connected to Egypt’s own internal political
situation.
The Egyptian government under the leadership of
Mubarak and now under that of al-Sissi, has long been
hostile toward Hamas because of its Muslim Brotherhood connections. Mubarak told a Western journalist
in the mid-1990s that:
this whole problem of terrorism throughout the Middle East is a by-product of our illegal Muslim Brotherhood—whether it’s al-Jihad, Hizbollah, in Lebanon, or
Hamas. They all sprang from underneath the umbrella
of the Muslim Brotherhood.70

In the same interview, Mubarak added:
My own fear is that if there is a delay in the [peace]
process, if Arafat fails, all these extremists, all these
terrorists trained in Afghanistan, will rush to Gaza
and join Hamas. It will be a disaster and cause one hell
of a problem for us.71
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Similarly, al-Sissi, since his ouster of Morsi as president in early-July 2013, has put all of the blame for
Egypt’s terrorist activity at the feet of the Muslim
Brotherhood, which the government has declared a
“terrorist” organization and has banned its political
wing, the Freedom and Justice Party, from participating in elections.72 Al-Sissi’s strategy has been to discredit and weaken both the Brotherhood and Hamas
since he believes they feed off each other.
The exception to this hostile position toward
Hamas was during the Morsi presidency (2012-13),
when Morsi showed sympathy and, at times, expressed solidarity, with Hamas, sent his prime minister to Gaza in a show of solidarity with Hamas during
another mini-war with Israel, and even helped to broker a truce between Hamas and Israel in November
2012. Nonetheless, this pro-Hamas position was not
shared by the entire government apparatus, which
constrained Morsi’s actions to some degree. As two
scholars have recently noted:
While one might have thought that Morsi would have
opened the floodgates to Hamas, the Brotherhood’s
ideological bedfellow, in actuality Egypt kept the border with Gaza largely closed during his presidency
and continued efforts to destroy tunnels. Whatever his
personal sympathies, Morsi stayed within the lines of
a policy designed to ensure that Egypt was not stuck
holding the Gaza hot potato.73

Morsi continued to leave the Sinai/Gaza/Hamas
portfolio largely to Egypt’s military and intelligence
services. He may have wanted to change policy but
probably understood that to undercut the military
and intelligence services’ domination of this portfolio was a bridge too far. He may have also shared the
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belief, prevalent among Egyptian political elements,
that Israel wanted to push the Gaza problem onto the
Egyptians.74 Given Egypt’s unhappy experience administering the Gaza Strip from 1948 to 1967, and the
mounting issues of overpopulation, poverty, and terrorism in the Gaza Strip, Morsi may not have wanted
to take on this headache since he had enough problems in mainland Egypt.
That said, there were always suspicions in Egypt
from the Brotherhood’s enemies that the Brotherhood
was actively conspiring with Hamas. Indeed, within
the anti-Brotherhood camp, it is widely believed that
Morsi, in jail during the time of the Egyptian revolution in early-2011, had conspired with Hamas to break
himself free from prison in Egypt. In fact, this claim
has since become one of many official charges that the
Egyptian government has leveled against Morsi in his
on-again, off-again, criminal trial.75
These beliefs of a nefarious Hamas-Brotherhood
nexus, however, do not mean that the Egyptian government did not have its own channel to Hamas. Indeed, Egyptian intelligence under Mubarak, which
was concerned about divisions among the Palestinians, had long worked behind the scenes to try to bring
about a rapprochement between Hamas and its secular Palestinian rival, Fatah.76 These efforts did not succeed in part because Hamas knew that the Egyptian
authorities favored the more moderate Fatah, and did
not want to play second fiddle in a unity government.
Ironically, shortly before the outbreak of the latest Gaza conflict in July 2014, such a Palestinian unity
government had just come together, at least on paper.
It appears that Hamas was compelled to agree to such
a unity government in part because it was becoming
increasingly isolated in the Arab world.77 Egypt was
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not averse to such a unity government because it appeared that Fatah would be the dominant player in it.
However, the Gaza war posed a challenge for alSissi because it had the potential to put the Egyptian
government in a quandary. Keeping the border with
Gaza closed and not allowing significant supplies to
enter ran the risk of looking indifferent to the plight
of Palestinian civilians, which took the brunt of the Israeli military attacks. On the other hand, the Egyptian
government did not want to see Hamas emerge as victor by its firing of hundreds of missiles into Israel and
its ability to withstand the Israeli attacks. For this reason, the Egyptian media, as mentioned earlier, went
out of its way in characterizing Hamas as reckless
and irresponsible for putting the lives of hundreds of
thousands of Palestinian civilians in jeopardy.
Unfortunately, there have not been any recent polls
in Egypt to gage the reaction of the Egyptian people to
what is happening in Gaza, but anecdotal evidence and
media monitoring suggests that reactions have fallen
largely along the political fault lines that are apparent in Egypt’s polarized society between supporters
of al-Sissi and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Pro-government citizens, which at this point are probably a majority, sided against Hamas and supported
al-Sissi’s policies. They tended to believe the government’s characterization of Hamas as putting Palestinian civilians in danger, and that Hamas, in conjunction
with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, was aiding
the terrorism in the Sinai and in mainland Egypt.78
Even a few pro-government media commentators
praised Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli army for
trying to crush Hamas, (though such statements were
probably not shared by the majority of the pro-government supporters).79 Some Egyptian interlocutors
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believe that the Egyptians’ generally pro-Palestinian
position may be changing in the wake of the terrorist
threats facing Egypt.80 The widespread belief among
pro-government Egyptians that the Brotherhood and
Hamas are out to destroy Egypt by colluding in terrorist acts has apparently affected their view toward
the Palestinian cause and has dampened their support
for the Palestinian people. Support for the Palestinians
(not just Hamas) may have indeed dropped, and we
may be witnessing a period similar to what occurred
in Egypt after the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian
peace treaty in 1979 when an emphasis on Egyptian
nationalism prevailed over all other concerns. This
anti-Palestinian sentiment, however, is likely to be a
passing phenomenon, and once the terrorism problem
in Egypt dissipates, there may be a return to the Egyptian people’s generally pro-Palestinian position.
Not surprisingly, supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood have been strongly opposed to the Egyptian
government’s position on Hamas and the Gaza war,
have laid the blame on Israel for starting it. They have
charged that al-Sissi’s government has actively colluded with Israel to punish the Palestinians. Because
Egyptian society is so polarized, the Brotherhood (or
what is left of the organization after widespread government arrests) would oppose almost anything alSissi’s government does because it considers that government to be illegitimate and a mortal enemy. But
its supporters probably believe these charges, given
their ideological outlook. As mentioned earlier, Brotherhood supporters tried to demonstrate in the streets
in July 2014 during the Gaza conflict, but such protests
were quickly suppressed. They tried to demonstrate
again the following month to mark the 1-year anniversary of the government’s severe crackdown on the
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pro-Morsi protestors in August 2013, during which
over 600 people died in a single day, but the government suppressed these demonstrations as well.81
Because the Egyptian government understands
that most Egyptians want stability and an end to terrorism in their own country, it has been trying to conflate Hamas’ endangerment of the Palestinian people
to the Brotherhood/terrorists’ endangerment of the
Egyptian people, not to mention what it sees as assistance flowing back and forth between these two extremist groups. This conflation works up to a certain
point. However, the government also understands
that anti-Israeli sentiment rises among the Egyptian
citizens during such periods of conflict in Gaza, and
thus it has a vested interest in pushing for a ceasefire
to dampen public calls that the government needs to
do more to help the Palestinians under siege. Keeping
the Sinai border closed to Palestinians (and restricting the shipments of aid to them) over time becomes
a problem for the Egyptian government. Although
Egypt has other reasons for brokering a cease-fire between Hamas and Israel, namely, returning to an Arab
leadership role and undercutting the influence of other regional players,82 its domestic reasons for wanting
the violence to end may be more important.
Although the Gaza conflict ended with a truce, one
proposal that has been bandied about is for the Palestinian Authority (under the domination of Fatah) to
control Gaza.83 Such a solution would be welcomed by
Egypt and probably by Israel—the latter with qualifications, namely that Hamas should be disarmed
and tunnels into Israel from Gaza be completely shut
down. Fatah, because of its more moderate position
and its close ties to the Egyptian government, would
probably be more receptive to Egyptian government
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calls to shut down the training camps of Palestinian
salafi groups who may be aiding extremists in the Sinai. If Fatah were to be in charge of Gaza (even with
Hamas’ political wing playing a secondary role in the
government), Egypt might be amenable to opening
the border with Gaza to allow for more goods to be
sent and sold there.
However, this optimistic scenario from Egypt’s
perspective could have unintended consequences. If
Fatah were in charge of Gaza and another military
confrontation with Israel were to take place (perhaps
being initiated by some salafi militant groups in Gaza
attacking Israel to embarrass Fatah), Egypt would be
even more in a quandary than it is now. Fatah would
then have to defend Gaza against a likely Israeli counterattack, and Fatah’s police and gendarmerie would
be compelled to fight against Israeli forces. Under this
scenario, Egypt would not be able to blame Hamas any
longer for irresponsible behavior, and whatever blame
it might assign to more extreme Palestinian salafi
groups for starting such a war, the conflict would soon
become a conflict between Fatah and Israel that Egypt
would not be able to manage domestically by media
manipulation. With Fatah in charge, there would be
more calls within the broader Egyptian public to come
to the aid of the people in Gaza. Although some elements of the Egyptian government would probably
not want to get involved in such a crisis because it has
the potential to scuttle the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, it might be very difficult for Egypt to keep the Sinai border with Gaza closed under this scenario. And,
more ominously for the counterterrorism campaign,
there would likely be diminishing support for Egypt’s
crackdown on the Sinai-based terrorist groups if such
groups re-directed their attacks to Israeli targets, espe-
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cially Israeli soldiers guarding the border. Hence, the
old adage of “be careful for what you wish for” may
be applicable in this case.
Public Perceptions of the Government’s Campaign
against Extremists in the Sinai.
As long as the extremists in the Sinai are seen doing damage to the Egyptian state and people—hitting
“Egyptian” targets, that is, army, police, and civilians,
as well as foreign tourists whose spending provides
revenue to the state and helps to employ Egyptian
workers—it appears that the majority of Egyptian citizens have no problems with the government’s harsh
crackdown on the extremists. Moreover, the more the
extremists show their true colors by employing brutal
tactics against ordinary Egyptian soldiers and people
who cooperate with the government, the support for
the crackdown is likely to increase. As mentioned earlier, most Egyptians desire stability, and the terrorist
attacks in the Sinai and the Egyptian mainland are a
threat to this goal. Furthermore, the chaos in Syria and
Iraq—especially the military advances and the brutal
tactics of ISIL, as well as the instability in Libya next
door, makes the Egyptian public even more concerned
about terrorism and instability. Most Egyptians do not
want to see their country descend into the morass that
is now convulsing these and some other countries in
the region, especially since Egypt also has a sectarian
issue that it needs to manage carefully. About 10 percent of its population are Coptic Christians who have
faced sporadic acts of sectarian violence in the recent
decades; such violence escalated to high levels during
the summer of 2013 when scores of Coptic churches
were torched or damaged by supporters of the Mus-
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lim Brotherhood who were angry that the Coptic community supported the new government after Morsi
was ousted.84 The Egyptian government under al-Sissi
and its supporters, like former foreign minister Amre
Moussa, understand these public fears and have used
the media to underscore to Egyptian citizens that had
al-Sissi not intervened to oust Morsi, “We would have
ended up with groups like ISIS doing the same in
Egypt.”85 This point is debatable, of course, because
there is no way to know for sure whether Morsi was
going to lead Egypt to an intolerant state that would
support such extremists, but certainly this is how the
new government and its supporters are framing the
issue, knowing of the public’s fear of such a scenario.
For the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood—
which at its peak in 2012 held the allegiance of about
a quarter of the population,86 but has since dropped
to an unknown percentile—the government’s harsh
crackdown in the Sinai is symptomatic of the “illegitimate” military regime that used violence against the
Brotherhood in the summer of 2013 and arrested thousands of its leaders, activists, and supporters since that
time. In all likelihood, as indicated earlier, the Brotherhood is probably not behind the violence in the Sinai
and it denies links to such extremist groups, but it is
now more concerned with the self-preservation of its
remaining cadres and trying to capitalize on issues
where it thinks the government is vulnerable—like
closing the Sinai-Gaza border and cooperating with
Israel against Hamas. The Brotherhood understands
that the Egyptian public is not concerned that some
innocent Bedouin villagers are killed in the government’s counterterrorism operations because the public’s sympathy remains with the military in these operations. The attack by extremists on an Egyptian border
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outpost in the Western desert that killed 23 Egyptian
officers and soldiers elicited broader public anger
than the deaths of hundreds of Brotherhood supporters and activists in the summer of 2013, at least among
secular-oriented Egyptians.87
The chief, outspoken opponents of the government’s harsh crackdown in the Sinai are Egypt’s
human rights activists and a few Sinai Bedouin villagers who have gone to university in the Egyptian
mainland. They are the ones who have raised the issue
of a counterterrorism campaign that has gone to excesses—some 300 people killed in the Sinai from July
2013 to April 2014, most of whom were civilians88—
and have provided such information to the independent and foreign press. While it is likely that Egypt’s
human rights community will continue to raise this
issue, which at times becomes an embarrassment for
the government, it is unlikely that they will get much
traction, given the general public’s abhorrence of terrorism and its condescending attitudes toward the
Bedouins. As mentioned earlier, the general public’s
views on government policy toward the Sinai might
change if there is a different situation in Gaza—like
a war between Fatah and Israel. But barring this scenario, it seems that the human rights community is
not going to sway Egyptian public opinion when it
issues reports and highlights the government’s draconian policies in the Sinai. Hence, it seems that the
Egyptian general public has given, and will continue
to give, the government wide leeway for its security
crackdowns in the Sinai.
Ironically, the institution that might be the most
receptive to a change in the Egyptian military’s harsh
policies in the Sinai may be the Egyptian military
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itself, or at least elements of the military’s officer corps.
This potential for a change in policy is not because of
the military’s kindheartedness toward the Bedouins,
nor because of a change in outlook toward the extremists. Rather, it may arise purely out of tactics.89 The
policy of using helicopters and tanks to destroy dozens of homes, hundreds of olive trees, and even whole
villages has the potential to backfire by creating more
extremist sympathizers and more young disaffected
Bedouin youths willing to join the extremist groups.
This trend is already underway. While draconian
counterterrorism policies may temporarily reduce extremist violence—there was indeed a dip in extremist
attacks in the spring of 2014—such a downward trend
is unlikely to last. Indeed, after this dip, extremist violence increased in the summer of 2014. Part of this uptick violence may be because some Egyptian extremists who were fighting in Syria may have returned to
Egypt to bring the fight home, but it also may be because new Bedouin recruits from these damaged villages have finished their training with the extremists
and are now part of the fight. Countering this trend
with more effective policies presents an opportunity
for the United States in Egypt.
Recommendations for U.S. Policy.
The evidence presented herein, albeit largely anecdotal, suggests that the vast majority of Egyptians
want the terrorism problem of the Sinai to end as soon
as possible. If the United States can be of assistance
in this process, it would not only help the Egyptian
economy rebound because of the likely pick up in
tourism and foreign direct investment, it will also help
improve bilateral U.S.-Egyptian relations. Even some
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legal opposition parties in Egypt have indicated privately that if the terrorism problem emanating from
the Sinai were to be eliminated, or at least sharply
reduced, and U.S. assistance was seen as helpful in
this endeavor, the U.S. image in Egypt would greatly
improve.90
Bilateral U.S.-Egyptian relations hit a low point in
2013 because of the widely held perception in Egypt
that the United States aided and abetted Morsi’s authoritarian presidency out of some conspiratorial U.S.
plan to assist radical Islamists.91 U.S. criticism of the
interim government’s harsh crackdown on Morsi’s
Muslim Brotherhood supporters in August 2013 and
the U.S. decision 2 months later to suspend a substantial part of U.S. military assistance package to
Egypt, including Apache helicopters, further exacerbated tensions in the relationship. Although most of
this assistance has been resumed and relations have
rebounded to some degree, tensions still remain.
The key question is how the United States can assist
Egypt in its counterterrorism campaign that is most
effective and not counterproductive. U.S. policymakers need to emphasize to their Egyptian counterparts
the need for a comprehensive approach. This involves
persuading Egyptian officials that draconian policies
are unlikely to solve the problem. A more effective way
to isolate and weaken the terrorist groups in the Sinai
is to deny them recruits from the Bedouin villages and
deny them safe haven in such villages. Such a policy
involves putting more economic resources into the Sinai, providing more jobs for the disaffected Bedouin
youths (such as in the tourist towns which heretofore
have recruited mostly mainland Egyptians) so they
will not rely on smuggling, and changing government
policies to recruit Bedouins into a local police force.
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Egyptian government officials would need to vet carefully the youth who enter such sensitive positions as
policemen and tourist workers to ensure that extremists would not take advantage of such openings and
infiltrate these positions.
In addition, a substantial portion of U.S. economic
assistance should be channeled to the Sinai to help
in job training programs for the Bedouin youths. For
example, for Bedouin youths wanting to work in the
tourism industry, there could be educational programs to teach languages such as English, French, or
German, as well as certain hotel jobs, followed by paid
internships in the tourist sector. The United States
could also help defray the costs of police training for
Bedouin youths.
There is currently a U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) program in the Sinai called
“Livelihood and Income from the Environment” that
seeks to help low-income Bedouins living mainly in
the central part of the Sinai by promoting projects that
are environmentally sustainable. It focuses on such
projects as small infrastructure; public transportation
systems; and roads, water desalination, and vocational training.92 While well-intentioned, this program
needs to be expanded to include the substantial job
training for the tourism industry mentioned earlier,
expansion of the program to the northern Sinai region,
and more U.S. Government funding. This program
has only been funded at $9 million. Given the scope of
the problem in the Sinai, it should be funded at a more
substantial level, in the range of $50 million per year.
Although U.S. economic assistance to Egypt has fallen
from an annual $800 million more than a decade-anda-half ago to about $200 million today, and $50 million
for the Sinai might take away from other worthwhile
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projects that USAID administers in mainland Egypt,
a compelling case can be made to the U.S. Congress
that an increase in overall U.S. economic assistance
to Egypt that would incorporate $50 million for the
Sinai is important for U.S. national security interests.
Given the increased instability in the Middle East in
such countries as Syria, Iraq, and Libya, the U.S. administration would need to emphasize that such an
increase in economic assistance to Egypt will help
Egypt combat terrorism. Given the fact that the Sinai
borders both the Gaza Strip and Israel, the national
security argument for such an increase (still small by
historical standards) for both human and infrastructure development in the Sinai would be compelling.
Besides persuading the U.S. Congress of the merits of this increased support for the development of
the Sinai, U.S. officials also need to persuade Egyptian officials of the program’s merits. It is likely that
the current USAID program in the Sinai is limited
not just because of U.S. financial constraints, but because Egyptian officials are wary about any outside
programs in the Sinai Peninsula because it is largely a
closed military zone.
There have been discussions among U.S. and
Egyptian officials of resuming a bilateral strategic dialogue between the two countries. Such a dialogue was
held in the 1990s.93 Because such a dialogue would be
held behind closed doors, sensitive issues could be
discussed in this venue outside of the limelight. This
would be perfect for U.S. civilian and military officials
to discuss the terrorist problem in the Sinai and more
effective ways to deal with it. U.S. officials can use the
opportunity to discuss the merits of an expanded job
training program mentioned earlier as well as the very
sensitive issue of creating a local police force made up
of Bedouin recruits.
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In such a dialogue, U.S. officials should also mention the need to empower Sinai tribal leaders as a hedge
against the extremists. Press reports indicate that over
the past few years, many of the Bedouin residents have
turned to informal Sharia (Islamic law) courts for the
adjudication of disputes because the state court system in the Sinai was seen as incompetent and corrupt.
In the process, however, these Sharia courts have also
undermined traditional Bedouin tribal law known
as “urf” which had adjudicated disputes over many
centuries. Partly because of the proliferation of the
Sharia courts in the Sinai, “the fragmentation of local
authorities has been deeply frustrating to tribal leaders seeking the protection of the state.”94 Egyptian officials are well aware of this sentiment but do not seem
to have a viable plan to deal with it or take advantage
of tribal leaders’ resentment of the extremists. U.S. officials can share with their Egyptian counterparts their
experiences in Iraq during the “Awakening” in 200708 when the United States changed its policy toward
the insurgency by reaching out and empowering the
Sunni tribes of western and central Iraq to turn against
al-Qaeda affiliated extremists.
Recommendations for U.S. Landpower.
U.S. military officials, especially U.S. Army officers, should be an integral part of this strategic dialogue dealing with the terrorist problem in the Sinai.
U.S. Army officers who took part in the “Awakening”
in Iraq should share their experiences with both Egyptian civilian and military officials. Egyptian officials
are very sensitive about outsiders, particularly Westerners, telling them what to do, especially on the security front, and for historical and cultural reasons would
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not want to be compared with Iraqis. Therefore, U.S.
Army officers should approach this issue delicately by
way of a briefing, describing what worked and what
did not work in Iraq with the Arab Sunni tribes. Moreover, because of the advance of ISIL in Iraq in the summer of 2014 and the need for U.S. and Iraqi officials to
approach these Sunni tribes once again to entice them
to scuttle their alliance with extremists, U.S. Army officers should also ask their Egyptian counterparts for
advice. Such a discussion about Iraq could then lead
to a discussion about the Sinai and how to entice the
Bedouins there to move away from the extremists, using a more holistic approach.
U.S. Army officers should also bring up Egypt’s
successful campaign against the violent extremist
groups, like the Islamic Group and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, in the 1990s. Egypt first used just the “stick,”
brute force, against the extremists, but when that did
not work, it used both the carrot and the stick. The
former involved more development assistance to poor
neighborhoods in Cairo and poor rural areas of Upper
Egypt, from where the young terrorists came from,
and effective propaganda to show that the terrorists
were targeting innocent civilians and foreign tourists
that hurt Egyptian families trying to make a living.95
Although Egyptian officials might argue that the Bedouins are different and require a different approach,
U.S. Army officers should emphasize that they too
found that the carrot and stick approach was indeed
more effective in dealing with disaffected tribes.
In addition, the U.S. Army should offer to provide specialized counterterrorism classes to Egyptian
military officers at U.S. professional military education institutions. Given that al-Sissi himself was a
student at the U.S. Army War College, it is likely that
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he would approve such training.96 These specialized
classes should emphasize effective ways to seek out
and capture extremists in a village without punishing the whole village and creating more extremists in
the process.
Coupled with this leadership training, the U.S.
Army should offer to train whole Egyptian units involved in counterterrorism operations through joint
field exercises, or at a minimum, by specialized U.S.
Army trainers. Before being deployed to Iraq, many
U.S. Army units practiced counterterrorism techniques in “mock villages” on U.S. military bases that
were designed to be as realistic as possible. Training
Egyptian army units in such a hands-on way would
not only provide them with effective counterterrorism
techniques but would move them away from the kind
of “scorched-earth” practices they have used so far in
the Sinai.
If Egyptian army units would not want to train in
the United States, then perhaps they could do so in remote areas of a friendly Arab country like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, or Jordan, where U.S.
Army trainers could be brought in. Such countries
may not be averse to hosting such U.S. training for the
Egyptian army provided that it is out of the limelight,
because they all have an interest seeing Egypt succeed
in its fight against the extremists.
Once these units return to Egypt after their U.S.
Army training, there may be a tendency among Egyptian military leaders to say, “Thank you very much,
but now we will deal with the terrorists in the Sinai
on our own. We know these people, how they think
and operate.” The danger in this scenario is that the
Egyptian military might revert to their usual heavyhanded practices. If such a situation arises, the United
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States should use its levers to persuade the Egyptian
military to rethink this position and pursue policies
that have been learned. If the Egyptian military uses
its old practices, such as using U.S. Apache helicopters to attack whole villages as opposed to concentrating on such targets as terrorist camps, the U.S. Army
should favor holding up the transfer of spare parts for
these helicopters and the delivery of new helicopters.
The Egyptian military undoubtedly would react very
angrily to this suspension of military assistance, as it
has done in the recent past,97 but using such weapons
for indiscriminate attacks against civilians is a tactic
that the U.S. Army should counsel its counterparts to
cease. Given that the U.S. image in Egypt is still problematic, the U.S. Army should avoid even the appearance of being complicit, even indirectly, in such indiscriminate attacks. This “tough-love” approach would
be a strong signal to the Egyptian military that, while
the United States “stands by you in your fight against
the extremists, there are limits to what we will countenance.” Some Egyptian military officers, because they
understand that the old ways of dealing with the terrorists are not working, may come to understand the
need for the new approach.
Finally, the U.S. military should continue to provide the Egyptian military with sophisticated equipment and intelligence to monitor extremist activity
in the Sinai. On August 20, 2002, about 2 weeks after
extremists killed 16 Egyptian soldiers along the border with Israel, CNN reported that the Pentagon offered to provide Egypt’s army on the Sinai with truckmounted sensors that provide an electronic signal
identifying which nation is operating the vehicle, even
from a great distance. The same report stated that the
U.S. administration offered Egypt more intelligence
sharing, including satellite imagery, drone flights, and
41

intercepts of cell phone and other communications
among extremists suspected of planning attacks in
the Sinai.98 Such offers of assistance should continue,
not only to help Egypt thwart terrorist attacks, but to
underscore the U.S. commitment to Egypt’s security.
Given the July 2014 attack against Egyptian soldiers
in the western desert near Libya, such sophisticated
equipment should be offered to the Egyptian army in
that region as well.
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